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1 Introduction
During 1997, a team from Hernandez Engineering, MSFC, Rocketdyne, Thiokol,
Pratt & Whitney, and USBI completed the first phase of a two year Quantitative Risk
Assessment of the Space Shuttle. The models for the Shuttle systems were entered
and analyzed by a new QRA software package. This system, termed the Quantitative
Risk Assessment System(QRAS), was designed by NASA and programmed by the
University of Maryland. The software is a groundbreaking PC-based risk assessment
package that allows the user to model complex systems in a hierarchical fashion.
Features of the software include the ability to easily select quantifications of failure
modes, draw Event Sequence Diagrams(ESDs) interactively, perform uncertainty
and sensitivity analysis, and document the modeling. This paper illustrates both the
approach used in modeling and the particular features of the software package. The
software is general and can be used in a QRA of any complex engineered system.
The author is the project lead for the modeling of the Space Shuttle Main Engines
(SSMEs), and this paper focuses on the modeling completed for the SSMEs during
1997. In particular, the groundrules for the study, the databases used, the way in
which ESDs were used to model catastrophic failure of the SSMEs, the methods
used to quantify the failure rates, and how QRAS was used in the modeling effort are
discussed. Groundrules were necessary to limit the scope of such a complex study,
especially with regard to a liquid rocket engine such as the SSME, which can be shut
down after ignition either on the pad or in flight. The SSME was divided into its
constituent components and subsystems. These were ranked on the basis of the
possibility of being upgraded and risk of catastrophic failure. Once this was done the
Shuttle program Hazard Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
were used to create a list of potential failure modes to be modeled. The groundrules
and other criteria were used to screen out the many failure modes that did not
contribute significantly to the catastrophic risk. The Hazard Analysis and FMEA for
the SSME were also used to build ESDs that show the chain of events leading from
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thefailuremodeoccurrencetooneof thefollowingendstates:catastrophicfailure,
engineshutdown,orsuccessfuloperation(successfulwithrespecttothefailuremode
underconsideration).TheSSMEhasalongtesthistorythatwasusedtoquantifythe
failuremodeandthepivotaleventsin theESDs.Thequantificationf thesevents
consistedof an uncertaintydistributiontbr the probabilityof eachevent's
occurrence.(_RAS was used to build the ESDs/'or the failure mode models, and also
to quantify the uncertainty about each event probability in the ESDs. Features of the
software as they apply to the modeling of the SSME are discussed. One of the failure
mode models is discussed in detail. It is shown how the ESD ['or the failure mode
was drawn using QRAS, and how uncertainty analysis was performed. Also, the
sensitivity analysis module is discussed. The information about QRAS presented
here is contained in [1].
2 Modeling and QRAS
2.1 Modeling Process
The SSME has hundreds of potentially catastrophic failure modes. Groundrules were
used to limit the scope of the study. The most important groundrule was to focus the
SSME QRA analysis on the major risk drivers, while de-emphasizing secondary risk
issues, such as aborts. Indeed, abort scenarios were not modeled in the 1997 study.
The study only considered those failures which lead to a catastrophic failure of the
SSMEs. Initiators occurring outside the Shuttle vehicle (e.g., ground support
equipment failures and severe weather) were excluded.
Due to time constraints, the QRA team, after discussions with engineers at MSFC
and at Rocketdyne, decided to model four SSME components during the 1997 study.
These were the High Pressure Fuel Turbopump, High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump,
Main Combustion Chamber, and the Nozzle. The rest of the engine components are
being modeled during 1998. The decision to model these was based upon two
interrelated factors: catastrophic risk and upgrade potential. Once the components to
be modeled were chosen, a list of potential failure modes was created using the
Shuttle program FMEA and Hazard Analysis. Several criteria were used to screen
the failure modes to a manageable level. All events in the Hazard Analysis fault tree
that are categorized as being an accepted risk but have a catastrophic effect were
modeled. Events are classified as accepted risk if there is sufficient doubt about the
ability of the control processes to prevent the occurrence of the event[2]. Also,
events having a Deviation Approval Request (DAR - a deviation from original
specifications) were considered for modeling. For example, the porosity of the
turbine blades in the HPFTP was included because such a problem caused an
uncontained failure of an SSME on a test stand in 1991. This particular event was
classified under accepted risk in the Hazard Analysis and the turbine blades have
been life-limited by a DAR to 4300 seconds. Finally, the list of events selected for
modelingwasreviewedwithengineersatMSFCandRocketdyne.A fewadditional
eventswerethenadded.Inall,50failuremodesweremodeledfortheSSME.
Oncethislistwasagreedupon,thesystemdecomposition(calledthe"hierarchy")
couldbeconstructedusingQRAS,asshownin Figure1. For theSSME,the
hierarchycor_sistsofsubsystems,components,andfailuremodes.Thefailuremodes
aregroupedby component,andthecomponentsaregroupedby subsystem.As
showninFigurel, oneoftheSSMEsubsystemsis theFuelTurbopumps,andoneof
its componentsis theHPFTP.Oneof thefailuremodesin theHPFFPisThermal
ShieldFailure.
Figure1.SSMEHierarchyandESDinQRAS.
2.2 Event Sequence Diagrams
Once selected for modeling, each failure mode was extensively analyzed. The first
step in this process was the creation of an Event Sequence Diagram(ESD). An ESD
explains how a failure mode (which is the initiating event in some ESD) can lead to
an end state of interest (e.g., catastrophic failure). An example of an ESD is shown in
Figure 1.
The ESD was drawn in QRAS using the ESD editor, which has an easy to use point-
and-click interface. A circle, representing the initiating event, is drawn automatically
after the failure mode is created. Once this is done, the user can add pivotal events
(represented by rectangles), comment boxes (represented by parallelograms), and
endstates(representedbydiamonds).Thisisdonebydepressingtheappropriate
buttonin thefloatingtoolbar.
TheESDinFigure1is fortheThermalShieldDamagefailuremodein theHPFTP.
Theconcernis thatthermalshielddamagemaycauseflowblockage,resultingin
lossof turbinepower.Thiswill leadtoareductioni turbopumpspeed.Theworst
consequenceis theincreaseof theHPFTPdischarget mperatureto suchanextent
thatit exceedstheredlinelimitprotectedbytwodualoutputsensors.
IntheESD,onceThermalShieldDamagehasoccurred,thefirstpivotaleventasks
whetherthethermalshieldhasexperiencedfewerthan17starts.Dueto previous
problemswiththethermalshield,it hasbeenlife-limitedto 17starts.Thus,if the
thermalshieldhasseenatleast17starts,it will beremoved.A newthermalshield
will replaceit, whichwill resultin missionsuccess(withrespectto thisfailure
mode).Missionsuccessi denotedin thefigureby"MS."However,if theunithas
experiencedfewerthan17starts,it will beflown.Thiseventwasincludedin the
ESDbecausemostof thefailuredataavailablefor analysisoccurredon thermal
shieldsthathadexperiencedmorethan17starts.Includingthispivotaleventisa
way to useall the availabledatain theanalysisof thefailuremodewhile
incorporatingtheincreasein thereliabilitydueto thelife limit.Thenextpivotal
eventis exceedanceof theHPFTPdischarget mperaturer dline(limit).If this
occurs,theenginewillattempttoshutdown.Theassumptionwasmadeherethatthe
onlywayinwhichthiscanfailisforthesensoroutputofail.Failureoftheengineto
shutdownleadstocatastrophicfailureof theengine,whichisanendstatedenotedby
"CAT." Sinceabortswerenotmodeled,it wasassumedthatanengineshutdown
wouldnotleadto acatastrophicfailure.Thus,onceengineshutdownoccurs,the
missioncontinuesbutwithouttheuseofoneofthethreeSSMEs.Thatis,"mission
success"(withrespecttothisfailuremode)occurs,butwiththe lossofaredundant
item.Thisendstateisdenoted"MSR."
2.3 Quantification
Once the ESD is drawn the initiating and pivotal events must be quantified. This
involves not merely a point estimate, but an uncertainty distribution for the
probability of occurrence of each event in the ESD. There are several options
available for quantification of the ESD events. One of these is the specification of an
uncertainty distribution that has been obtained via analysis completed off-line. The
distributions available for this choice are: Uniform, Normal, Lognormal, Triangular,
Beta, Gamma, Weibull, and Tabular. The user can also define a function of physical
variables; create a predefined function for the failure probability via logistic
regression; create a limit state function; or specify a reliability function. Several
other options will be added to this list in the next version of the software (some of
the future enhancements that will be included in the next version are mentioned in
section 2.5).
Notall of thequantitativeanalysiswascompletedusingQRAS.Severalmethods
wereusedtoquantifyeventsoff-line,includingreliabilitygrowthmodels,Weibull
analysis,andBayesiantechniques.
MostSSMEeventsmodeledhadsufficientdatain theformof problemreportsfor
testsandflights.However,for someeventslittle failuredataexisted.Where
possible,TheQRAteamavoidedtheuseof expertopiniontoquantifyevents.In the
caseswheredatawasscarce,genericSSMEdatawassometimesused,aswas
ProbabilisticDesignAnalysis.All failuremodesfor the Pratt&WhitneyHigh
PressureOxidizerTurbopumpwereanalyzedusingprobabilisticdesignmethods.
All quantificationwasfullydocumentedinQRAS,includingtheassumptionsmade,
thedataandmethodsused,andtheresultsforeacheventquantified.Theusercan
viewthemodelingdocumentationbyright-clickingthemouseonanyeventinany
ESD,andthenchoosingthedocumentationoption.
OncealleventsinanESDarequantified,QRAScalculatestheprobabilityof each
endstate.FortheESDin Figure1,theprobabilityof occurrenceof catastrophic
failurecanbecalculatedasPr(CAT)=Pr(IE)*Pr(PE2)*Pr(PE3)*Pr(PE4).Thistype
of calculationisdonefor all ESDs(for moreinformationaboutESDs,see[3]).
Sinceall dependenciesandredundanciesarecurrentlyhandledin theESDs,the
resultsareaddedandthecross-productsaresubtractedto gettheresultsfor the
subsystem,element,andprojectlevel.Notethattheresultsarestoredforthefailure
mode,subsystem,andelementlevel.ThisaggregationcanbeperformedviaMonte
Carlosimulationorbyusingonlythemeansofthedistributions.
Whilethecurrentversionallowstheuserto definelimitstatefunctions,additional
probabilisticengineeringreliabilitymethodswill beincludedinVersion2. These
includetheincorporationf FastProbabilityIntegrationtechniques,andaMonte
Carloroutineforhandlinghyper-distributions.
2.4 Analysis Results
The analysis results can be viewed at the failure mode, subsystem, element, or
project level. For an end state, such as catastrophic failure, the results can be ranked
by mean risk. There are two ways to do this: by failure mode or by scenario (path to
an end state). This can be done at any level: for a subsystem, an element, or a
project.
Once an analysis has been run, sensitivity analyses can be performed in QRAS. The
most salient advantage of this feature is that it easily allows a comparison of risks
between an existing system and the same system after a proposed upgrade has been
implemented. This option allows the user to replace a subsystem with a subsystem
from another project. Other options include the ability to modify the quantification
of a failure mode, remove a subsystem, remove a failure mode, add a failure mode,
and modify an ESD.
2.5 QRAS Enhancements
Various limitations exist in the current version of QRAS. For example, all system
dependencies and redundancies must be incorporated in the ESDs. To rectify this,
fault tree arCd reliability block diagram support will be included in version 2. Also,
other modifications will be made to the current configuration to help the user in the
modeling of multiple failure modes, subsystems, etc. For example, in Version 1, one
of the failure modes is turbine blade cracking. Due to the nature of the data
available, the analysis was performed at the individual blade level. However, there
are 122 blades per pump. To incorporate this explicitly in QRAS, one would have to
enter the ESD 122 times.
In Version 2, the capability allowing the user to indicate multiple items per failure
mode, per subsystem, and per element will be included. Also, the ability to explicitly
model common cause failures and the failure of multiple but redundant items will be
included.
Several other features will be added, such as the capability to rank risk results not
only by the means, but by several different criteria, including the medians.
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